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Abstract: Cloud computing environments consist of many entities that have dif-
ferent roles, such as provider and customer, and multiple interactions amongst 
them. Trust is an essential element to develop confidence-based relationships 
amongst the various components in such a diverse environment. The current chap-
ter presents the taxonomy of trust models and classification of information sources 
for trust assessment. Furthermore, it presents the taxonomy of risk factors in cloud 
computing environment. It analyses further the existing approaches and portrays 
the potential of enhancing trust development by merging trust assessment and risk 
assessment methodologies. The aim of the proposed solution is to combine infor-
mation sources collected from various trust and risk assessment systems deployed 
in cloud services, with data related to attack patterns. Specifically, the approach 
suggests a new qualitative solution that could analyse each symptom, indicator, 
and vulnerability in order to detect the impact and likelihood of attacks directed at  
cloud computing environments. Therefore, possible implementation of the pro-
posed framework might help to minimise false positive alarms, as well as to im-
prove performance and security, in the cloud computing environment.  
Keywords: Cloud computing environment, Trust Assessment, Risk Assess-
ment, Taxonomy, Attack Pattern, Detection, Framework 
1.1 Introduction 
Cloud computing environment combines known technologies, such as virtual-
ization, big data, data warehousing and data mining. The advantages that it pro-
vides are increased performance, ease of deployment, elasticity of a service, and 
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anytime-anywhere access. A cloud computing environment with the aforemen-
tioned benefits, as well as its dynamic resource sharing and its cost effectiveness, 
draws the attention of many enterprises and individual users [1]. Especially, for 
technological developments such as mobile applications and Internet-of-Things 
(IoT), a cloud computing environment becomes the preferred way of deployment.  
Cloud services are provided dynamically to its users in a non-transparent man-
ner. Due to its complex infrastructure, it exhibits heterogeneous capabilities of 
services and resources [2, 3]. Therefore, users might not be confident in terms of 
controlling the data stored in the cloud. In addition, safeguarding users’ privacy 
and providing secure cloud based transactions is challenging. Establishing con-
sistent operational practices and performance, as well as reliable cloud services 
has also a level of difficulty. Therefore, from a cloud-user point of view, the relia-
bility of a cloud service is an important issue [4]. 
Every day a new announcement is released regarding cloud computing threats 
and security risks. Furthermore, security is highlighted as the most critical obsta-
cle in adapting cloud computing for a service [5]. As a result, cloud computing se-
curity issues lead to difficulties in terms of developing a well-defined assessment 
structure regarding the actual impact on security. This is justified by two key rea-
sons. Firstly, basic vocabulary terms, such as vulnerability, risk, and threat, are 
usually adopted interchangeably. Secondly, not all issues identified are specifical-
ly related to cloud computing [6, 7]. In order to establish a clear understanding 
about cloud-specific security issues, an analysis of how cloud computing influ-
ences security issues is required. A key factor is security vulnerabilities [8, 9]. 
This is important because security vulnerabilities could function as indicators that 
could in turn help detect cloud computing based attack patterns and vulnerabili-
ties. Before expanding on that, though, it is important to first establish what is a 
'vulnerability'? 
1.2 Vulnerability: An Overview 
Vulnerability is characterised as a prominent risk factor [10]. Specifically, the 
ISO 27000 defines risk as “the potential that a given threat will exploit vulnerabil-
ities of an asset or group of assets and thereby cause harm to the organization” 
[11]. The Open Group has developed an overview of the factors contributing to 
risk [12]. Specifically, as presented in Figure 1 it uses the same two top-level risk 
factors as ISO 27000, the likelihood of a harmful event (in diagram: loss event 
frequency) and its consequence (in diagram, probable loss magnitude). The proba-
ble loss magnitude’s sub-factors influence a harmful event’s ultimate cost (see 
Figure 1 on the right). On other hand, the loss event’s frequency sub-factors occur 
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when a threat agent, for instance a hacker, successfully exploits a vulnerability 
(see Figure 1 on the left). The frequency with which that develops is based on two 
factors:  
1) The frequency is determined by both the agent’s motivation and how much 
access the agents have to the attack targets. What is the level of effort? 
What is the risk level for the attackers? What can they gain from the at-
tack? and 
2) The difference between the threat agents’ attack capabilities and the sys-
tem’s strength to resist the attack [11, 12]. 
 
Figure 1: Taxonomy of Risk Factors (Open Group) based on [11] 
1.2.1 Definition of Vulnerability 
According to the aforementioned Open Group’s risk taxonomy factors a useful 
definition of vulnerability is developed. Vulnerability is defined as the probability 
that an asset will be unable to resist the actions of a threat agent. It exists when 
there is a difference between the force being applied by the threat agent, and an 
object’s ability to resist that force [13]. 
Thus, vulnerability should always be expressed in terms of resistance to a cer-
tain attack type. For instance, in a real world example, a car is not able to protect 
its driver against injury when hit frontally by a truck traveling at 60mph, is a vul-
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nerability. The resistance of the car’s crumple zone is simply too weak compared 
to the truck’s force. On the other hand, against the “attack” of a biker, or even a 
small car driving at a more moderate speed, the car’s resistance strength is perfect-
ly adequate [12]. 
Computer vulnerability can also be described as a removal or weakening of a 
certain resistance strength. For example, a buffer-overflow vulnerability weakens 
a system’s resistance to arbitrary code execution. Whether attackers can exploit 
this vulnerability, or not, depends on how capable they are [5].  
1.2.2 Vulnerabilities in Cloud Computing 
Having defined and explained the term ‘vulnerability’, this section examines 
how cloud computing can influence the risk factors presented in Figure 1. From a 
cloud-customer perspective, the right-hand side is related to the probable magni-
tude of future loss. Similarly to conventional IT infrastructure, in cloud computing 
the consequences and ultimate cost of, for instance, data confidentiality breach, is 
the same [14]. From a cloud-service perspective it looks a bit different. Cloud 
computing systems were previously separated on the same infrastructure; there-
fore, a loss event could be more impactful. However, this fact can be easily in-
cluded into a risk assessment, as no conceptual work is required to adapt impact 
analysis to cloud computing [8]. 
The left-hand side, in Figure 1, deals with the loss event frequency. Cloud 
computing could potentially alter the probability of a harmful event’s occurrence. 
Specifically, cloud computing could cause significant changes in the vulnerability 
factors, because moving to a cloud infrastructure might alter the attackers’ access 
level and motivation, as well as effort and risk [15]. To support a cloud-specific 
risk assessment it is important to start investigating the exact nature of cloud-
specific vulnerabilities. However, is there such thing as a “cloud-specific” vulner-
ability? If so, certain factors in a cloud computing environment should make a 
vulnerability cloud-specific. 
A cloud computing environment consists of many components with different 
roles that need to interact with each other. Depending on the context, the nature of 
interaction may differ. Trust is an essential aspect to achieve confidence-based in-
teractions amongst various entities in a cloud computing environment. Therefore, 
the taxonomy of trust models and classification of information sources for cloud-
specific risk assessment is needed for an effective trust assessment in a cloud 
computing environment. This in return might help identify factors that make a 
vulnerability cloud specific.  
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Trust assessment in a cloud computing environment requires facilitation of a 
wide range of aspects involving services; such as software, platform, and infra-
structure as a service, and deployment models; such as private, public, communi-
ty, and hybrid [16]. For that reason, the evolving dynamic of trust relationships 
amongst those entities makes trust assessment a vital area that needs addressing. 
In the following sections the taxonomy of trust assessment models, trust assess-
ment information sources, and trust dimensions in cloud computing are presented. 
1.3 Trust Assessment Models in Cloud Computing 
A trust model is defined as a collection of rules, elements, and process’ to de-
velop trust amongst the different entities in any computing paradigm. Specifically, 
cloud computing environment components such as databases, virtual machines, 
cloud service providers, cloud service customers, and cloud services are examples 
of different entities. Trust models are classified in two categories, decision models 
and evaluation models [17]. These models are applied to the cloud computing par-
adigm and are further developed through their connection with trust assessment 
techniques. This leads to the development of taxonomy of trust models and trust 
assessment techniques. Figure 2 presents taxonomy of trust models, in the follow-
ing sections a detailed description is provided. 
 
Figure 2: Taxonomy of Trust Assessment Models based on [17] 
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1.3.1 Decision Models 
The aim of a decision model is to provide an access control decision as a 
unique trust decision instead of following a relatively complex mechanism that in-
cludes authentication and authorization [5]. Decision models are categorised into 
two types, as policy models and negotiation models. The policy model employs 
credentials and policies in order to control access to different resources. Specifi-
cally, credentials and policies signify the essential permissions required to access 
various resources. The other type is the negotiation model that applies negotiation 
strategies in order to establish trust between two different entities [17].  
Cloud service providers may apply different audits and compliance standards to 
provide assurance to their users about the offered software, platforms, and services 
[18]. To increase the level of security third party assessment is provided by audi-
tors. This involves issuing the audit certificates based on the audit compliance. 
However, cloud service providers are not required to disclose the audit reports to 
the users [19]. A trust assessment technique, though, can employ credentials and 
policies of cloud service providers to customers in order to make a trust decision. 
Such credentials and policies may be set by applying standards such as X.509, 
digital certificates, or public key infrastructure (PKI) [2, 19]. In the cloud compu-
ting environment context, a Service Level Agreement (SLA) can be applied as a 
policy-based method that may provide trust assessment [6]. An SLA describes the 
functional and quality related facets of the offered cloud service [20]. The details 
of those aspects are specified during the negotiation process between cloud pro-
viders and cloud customers. Nevertheless, authenticating claims made by a cloud 
service provider as part of the SLA documentation necessitates an experienced 
and trusted third party [19]. In general, establishing trust via the use of credentials 
and policies can be difficult to achieve. Hence, it is considered as hard trust [20]. 
In the following section, the second type of trust models, evaluation models, is ex-
amined. 
1.3.2 Evaluation Models 
Evaluation models are defined as computational trust models; this is because 
trust assessment is dependent on evaluation of different parameters. Specifically, 
these parameters categorise the evaluation models in behavior models and propa-
gation models [6]. In behavior models, the aim is to compute the trust of the pre-
viously mentioned entities by measuring relevant factors such as reliability and 
performance. In propagation models, a new trust relationship is developed through 
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the data distribution of pre-existing trust values in communication paths to other 
entities [21].  
In the behavior model, a reputation technique may be applied as trust assessor 
of a cloud service. In particular, trust is measured via the combination of ratings 
submitted by a number of cloud users for a cloud service [19]. The measurement 
of trust may employ various methods like addition or averaging and fuzzy logic. 
The resulting value of trust signifies the degree of cloud users’ trust to a specific 
cloud service [20].  
On the other hand, the propagation models are using a recommendation based 
technique. Essentially, in this technique a cloud user develops a trust for a cloud 
service based on recommendations by trusted third party cloud users [20].  
Overall, both reputation and recommendation techniques employ factors such 
as feedback regarding trust assessment and ratings. Therefore, establishing trust 
through those elements is classed as soft trust [6]. 
1.4 Trust Assessment Information Sources in Cloud Computing 
The cloud users’ service-related needs are constantly changing in the diverse 
environment of cloud computing. Consequently, the role of various factors, such 
as feedback, ratings, and Quality of Service (QoS), in trust assessment is very im-
portant. In the following paragraphs, four trust assessment information sources are 
examined. Specifically, direct and indirect interaction, Cloud Service Provider 
declarations, and Third Party assessment [6]. These information sources are, then, 
correlated with various factors of the cloud computing environment. The outcome 
was a taxonomy of information sources for trust assessment that is presented in 
Figure 3 and then explained in the following sections. 
 
Figure 3: Taxonomy of Trust Information Sources based on [6] 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
1.4.1 Direct Interaction 
When a cloud user has past experiences with cloud services, then the source of 
information is the direct interaction between those two sides. Specifically, this 
type of information can be expressed as ratings provided by the cloud user after 
interacting with a cloud service. The factors for trust assessment can be in the 
form of QoS parameters and can be documented though monitoring during the 
process of interaction between a cloud service and a cloud user. The advantage of 
storing and reviewing a cloud user’s previous experiences is that the most relevant 
information can be used for trust assessment. However, such reviews will also in-
clude information that is insufficient, and as a result, not suitable for the purpose 
of trust assessment [19].  
1.4.2 Indirect Interaction 
When a cloud user has insufficient, or no past experience with cloud services, 
then the source of information is the indirect interaction between a cloud user and 
a cloud service. Specifically, assessment factors are calculated based on third par-
ty users’ experiences and can be in the form of feedback and/or ratings that are 
provided by third party cloud users regarding their cloud service experiences. In 
addition, this type of information could be acquired through the processing of data 
recorded by the cloud service provider. Consequently, the assessment conducted 
by employing this type of information could be considered of better validity. On 
the other hand, the information retrieved by third party users may be biased in 
terms of feedback quality and that is a potential concern. Therefore, the feedback 
collected as part of indirect interaction could be employed as initial assessment 
until direct interaction is made available [21]. 
1.4.3 Cloud Service Provider declarations 
A cloud service provider incorporates a set of parameters of cloud services that 
may include information related to privacy, security, integrity, and compliance. 
Nevertheless, all this information is based on the assessment conducted and pub-
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lished by the cloud service providers themselves. Therefore, the data authenticity 
needs to be confirmed [20]. 
1.4.4 Third Party Assessment 
Third Party Auditor (TPA) in cloud computing is a mechanism that inspects 
cloud services by reflecting on parameters such as privacy, performance and secu-
rity. The reports generated by TPA form an objective and a formal source of in-
formation that may be used for trust assessment [22]. 
1.5 Trust Dimensions in Cloud Computing 
A trust model measures the security strength and computes a trust value. A 
trust value comprises of various parameters that are necessary dimensions to 
measure cloud services’ security. In the consequent sections, the dimensions re-
garding effective trust assessment are identified.  
1.5.1 Multi-Criteria 
Trust assessment evaluation needs to entail various parameters like availability 
and reliability, in order to describe relevant qualities of the cloud provider and/or 
the cloud service [20]. Specifically, those parameters are categorised in objective 
and subjective parameters. The objective parameters incorporate real-time meas-
urement or ratings provided by users. The subjective parameters incorporate fac-
tors such as feedback provided by third party cloud service customers [19]. The 
combination of the aforementioned parameters is a challenging task. If it is suc-
cessful, though, it could lead to quality trust assessment. 
1.5.2 Context 
Each type of cloud service requires different performance specification based 
on the various applying scenarios. Therefore, a trust model should consider the 
different types of cloud services applied. The types that form distinct contexts for 
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trust assessment are Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Software as a Service 
(SaaS) [23].  
1.5.3 Pesronalisation 
In the cloud computing environment, there is a wide variety of user require-
ments about the trust assessment of the previously mentioned cloud services. A 
personalised service allows users to determine suitable requirements regarding 
trust evaluation from their perspective [6]. This enables users’ flexibility to speci-
fy their own unique preferences, needs, and information sources about trust as-
sessment.  
1.5.4 (De)-Centralised Trust Assessment  
In the centralised trust assessment approach the architecture consists of a cen-
tralised repository that stores the trust assessment related data. The mechanism can 
be simple to implement and the trust assessment data, such as ratings and pro-
cessing are conducted in a centralised entity/site. The main disadvantage is the 
possibility of failure of that centralised entity [21]. In the de-centralised trust as-
sessment method the trust related data are distributed amongst various enti-
ties/sites. Furthermore, the de-centralised architecture allows computation of trust 
data and storage in multiple sites of the distributed cloud computing environment. 
Therefore, it enables the scalability and redundancy characteristic to all its users. 
1.5.5 Adaptability  
In the various applications of a cloud computing environment there is a number 
of actors, such as cloud customer, cloud provider, cloud broker, cloud carrier, and 
cloud auditor, who could be situated around the globe. In addition, new cloud pro-
viders may be added or current users may be withdrawn from the cloud computing 
environment. In such a diverse environment with the potential for rapid change, 
alterations in the cloud infrastructure may occur constantly. Therefore, it is im-
portant for a trust model to adapt to any change seamlessly [6]. The term adapta-
bility signifies the degree of which a trust evaluation model adapts to the afore-
mentioned changes. 
11 
 
 
 
 
1.5.6 Credibility  
In the trust evaluation context of a cloud computing environment, credibility 
refers to the degree of service parameters or the data quality given as input for the 
trust assessment process [6, 21]. Therefore, encouraging the credibility of cloud 
services or the credibility of feedback provided by the cloud users is an essential 
task. 
1.5.7 Trust Dynamics  
In the dynamic cloud computing environment associations between two or 
more different entities are not fixed but evolve with experience. Therefore, trust 
amongst entities needs to be assessed and revised regularly [21].  
Having completed the presentation of the dimensions to be supported by trust 
management systems, an analysis of trust assessment frameworks is provided. 
1.6 Analysis of Trust Assessment Frameworks in Cloud 
Computing 
In the last ten years, researchers have been investigating the various aspects of 
trust assessment in the cloud computing environment. A series of important trust 
assessment frameworks are presented in the subsequent paragraphs. Specifically, 
the selection of the frameworks addressed is based on those involving a holistic 
approach focused on cloud services. In addition, the frameworks are presented in 
chronological order that can be seen in Table 1.  
To begin with, Noor et al. [24] proposed the design and implementation of 
CloudArmor, a reputation-based trust management framework that provides a set 
of functionalities to deliver Trust as a Service (TaaS). Specifically, it is an adap-
tive and robust model for measuring the credibility of user feedback to protect 
cloud services from malicious users. Furthermore, it offers comparison of the 
trustworthiness of cloud services. Ghosh et al. [25] suggested a framework that 
evaluates the associated risk in interacting with the cloud provider. This frame-
work performs the trust assessment of cloud provider in the context of SaaS, PaaS 
and IaaS. The next framework is proposed by Qu and Buyya [26]. It is a trust 
evaluation framework regarding selection of cloud infrastructure services. Specifi-
cally, it evaluates the trust of cloud services based on the subjective QoS require-
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ments and preferences of the cloud user. Noor et al. [27] recommended a generic 
analytical framework for trust management. In the frame work, interactions in 
cloud applications occur at three layers. For each layer, a set of dimensions is 
identified and the used as a benchmark to evaluate and analyse existing trust man-
agement research prototypes.  
The next trust assessment framework is proposed by Pawar et al [28] to meas-
ure the trustworthiness of an infrastructure provider. It evaluates trust by employ-
ing factors such as SLA, satisfaction ratings, and providers’ behavior values. Fur-
thermore, it takes into account the uncertainty of information during trust 
evaluation. Habib et al. [21] proposed an architecture that employs a centralised 
method to collect trust-related data from various sources. The framework is using 
a numbers of QoS parameters determined by the users, to measure trust assess-
ment of cloud providers. The final framework is suggested by Alhamad et al. [29]. 
It is a cloud trust framework that uses SLA and applies a business process moni-
toring.  Specifically, it takes advantage of the SLA cloud customer categorisation 
in various classes to enable domain specific trust values.  
Table 1 shows a comparative analysis of the aforementioned trust assessment 
frameworks. The table is structured by using the titles and information from the 
previously presented trust assessment related sections. The first column of the ta-
ble includes the Existing Work. This outlines the previously explained trust as-
sessment frameworks in chronological order. The second column, Trust Assess-
ment Models, describes the basic trust assessment techniques used in each 
framework. In the third column, which is titled as Trust Assessment Information 
Sources, the information sources and parameters are indicated. Finally, the fourth 
column is the Trust Dimensions that presents the features of the several dimen-
sions of trust assessment supported by the frameworks.  
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Table 1: Comparative Analysis of Trust Assessment Frameworks 
 
Existing 
Work 
Trust Assessment 
Models 
Trust Assessment Infor-
mation Sources 
Trust Dimen-
sions 
Noor et 
al. 2016 
[24] 
-Reputation,  
-Credibility,  
-Credentials,  
-Trust assessment 
of cloud service 
using fuzzy logic 
-User feedback (di-
rect/indirect interactions, 
collusion attacks) 
-Direct interaction (Dynamic 
QoS parameters, such as 
performance, availability) 
-Cloud Service Provider sat-
isfaction ratings and behav-
ior values 
-De-centralised 
architecture 
- A technique 
to identify 
credible feed-
back 
-Availability 
and security of 
Trust Manage-
ment System 
Ghosh et 
al. 2015 
[25] 
-SLA,  
-Reputation 
-Cloud customer Ratings  
-User feedback (di-
rect/indirect interactions) 
-Context of in-
teraction for 
trust assess-
ment 
-SLA based 
competence as-
sessment 
-Mathematical 
modeling of 
trust, reputa-
tion, compe-
tence and risk 
Qu et al. 
2014 
[26] 
-QoS parameters, 
-Trust assessment 
of cloud service 
using fuzzy logic 
-Expert ratings (static pa-
rameters, such as security) 
-Direct interaction (Dynamic 
QoS parameters, such as 
performance, availability) 
-Dynamic trust 
-Personalised 
trust evaluation 
Noor et 
al. 2013 
[27] 
-Reputation,  
-Policy,  
-Credentials 
-User feedback (di-
rect/indirect interactions, 
collusion attacks) 
-Direct interaction (Dynamic 
QoS parameters, such as 
performance, availability), 
-De-centralised 
architecture 
-A technique to 
identify credi-
ble feedback 
-Availability 
and security of 
Trust Manage-
ment System  
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Pawar et 
al. 2012 
[28] 
-Reputation,  
-Recommendation 
-Cloud Service Provider sat-
isfaction ratings and behav-
ior values 
-SLA indicators 
-Context in-
cludes IaaS and 
multi-cloud en-
vironment 
Habib et 
al. 2011 
[21] 
-Reputation,  
-Recommendation 
-User feedback 
-Expert ratings 
-Declarations of Cloud Ser-
vice Provider 
-Personalised 
trust evaluation 
-Integration: 
Combining 
feedback and 
other trust re-
lated factors 
from multiple 
sources 
Alhamad 
et al. 
2010 
[29] 
-SLA,  
-Negotation 
-Cloud Service Provider and 
Users experience 
-SLA agent reports 
-De-centralised 
architecture 
 
In the previous sections a classification of information related to vulnerabilities 
(risk factors), trust assessment models, trust assessment information sources, and 
trust dimensions of the cloud computing environment is presented. This analysis 
and taxonomy of information is considered crucial to better comprehend the novel 
approach recommended in the current research. Before doing that, though, a de-
scription of similar approaches is presented.  
1.7 Related Detection Approaches 
When it comes to detection approaches, security researchers require a mecha-
nism that can integrate and analyse a wide variety of data sources. Particularly, 
they need a mechanism that can process information that is generated by hetero-
genous sources implemented in any cloud computing environment. These mecha-
nisms should aim to detect attack patterns and reduce false positive alarms. 
Hansman et al, [30] employed five classifiers to describe different types of at-
tack. Specifically, classification by attack vendor, classification by attack target, 
classification by operational impact, classification by informational impact, and 
classification by defense. All this information can provide the network administra-
tor with data on how to mitigate or deter an attack. Amer and Hamilton [31] de-
veloped an ontology based attack model to assess the security of an information 
system from an attacker’s point of view. The aim of the assessment process is to 
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evaluate the effects of an attack. The process consists of four stages. The first 
stage consists of identifying the system’s vulnerabilities using automated vulnera-
bility tools. These tools evaluate vulnerabilities of computer systems, applications 
or networks and generate sets of scan results. The second stage, involves deter-
mining the attacks that might occur due to the previously identified vulnerabilities. 
In the third stage, the possible effects of those vulnerabilities are analysed. The 
fourth and final stage the attack effects are calculated.  
Patel et al. [32] proposed a taxonomy with four dimensions that provides classi-
fication covering network and computer attacks. Specifically, it provides assis-
tance in improving network and computer security, as well as language consisten-
cy through attack description. The first dimension focuses on classifying the 
attack. The second classifies the target of the attack. The third provides vulnerabil-
ity classification or uses criteria from Howard and Longstaff’s taxonomy [33]. The 
fourth dimension, addresses the effects of the attack. 
Ficco et al. [34] recommended a hybrid and event correlation approach for de-
tecting attack patterns. The process involves detecting symptoms by collecting di-
verse information at several cloud levels in order to perform a complex event 
analysis presented in an ontology. 
All of the previously mentioned methodologies demonstrate beneficial ontolo-
gy and taxonomy that may offer informative guidelines regarding cyber intrusions 
and attack analysis. However, there is lack of detail required to analyse all symp-
toms and attacks that could in return minimise the number of false positive alarms. 
For instance, the same attack in two different cloud services may have a different 
degree of impact, but in most existing systems it would be classed as a malicious 
attack by both services. 
The proposed framework addresses this issue, of a system generating multiple 
false positive alarms, through the implication of risk and trust assessment analysis 
in the detection process. In this approach, all actors, such as cloud providers and 
cloud customers participate in the data analysis to achieve a high level of infor-
mation and data processing. Before describing the proposed framework, though, 
the underpinning systems are presented. 
1.7.1 Intrusion Detection System 
An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is very important in terms of preventing 
an attack against an Information Technology (IT) organisation. An IDS conducts a 
security system diagnosis to discover all suspicious activities based on detection 
algorithms. Specifically, those systems can help to deter and prevent actions relat-
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ed to security breaches, system flaws, as well as potential threats that may lead to 
system violations [35].  
On the other hand, an IDS system may detect many false actions, but it may al-
so lead to a number of false positive alarms and authorized users identified as in-
truders. In a cloud computing environment where all resources are shared amongst 
cloud customers, this point becomes even more critical. In order to minimise the 
number of false positive alarms and improve the efficiency of attack detection in 
all cloud computing environments, the proposed framework includes both cloud 
service providers and cloud customers as part of the correlation process in all 
cloud layers (SaaS, PaaS, IaaS). 
1.7.2 Risk Assessment System 
Risk assessment can be identified as the potential that a given attack will ex-
ploit vulnerabilities of an asset or a group of assets to cause loss or damage to the 
assets. According to the ISO 27005 Risk Management, risk is measured by evalu-
ating the probability of successful attacks and the subsequent impact of those at-
tacks, should they occur [5]. 
 
Risk = Impact * Likelihood [36] 
 
Specifically, the term Impact refers to the degree of which a risk event might 
affect an enterprise, expressed in terms of: Confidentiality, Integrity, and Authen-
tication. The term Likelihood refers to the possibility that a given event may occur 
[5]. The implementation of the aforementioned equation in the proposed frame-
work aims to stimulate cloud customers to evaluate security risks and simplify the 
analysis of all identified events. 
1.8 Proposed Framework for Attack Pattern Detection through 
Trust and Risk Assessment 
The proposed framework is a predictive model that detects attack patterns 
based on trust assessment and risk assessment analysis. Figure 4 presents a corre-
lation process that consists of a sequence of activities that are designed to analyse 
all network traffic through cloud layers [37]. The proposed framework applies a 
correlation process that intends to unify different steps of correlation by adding 
17 
 
 
 
 
risk and trust assessment analysis in the diagnosis step, before the taxonomy step 
takes place.  
 
Figure 4: Correlation Process based on [37] 
An attack pattern is an abstraction mechanism that describes how an observed 
attack type is executed. Following the lifecycle of cyber-attack, when an attack 
occurs it uses several paths, from reconnaissance to exploitation, and aims to gain 
unauthorized access to data [38]. Through studying the impact effects of an attack 
and simplifying the analysis of monitored events, then it could be possible to min-
imise false positive alarms.  
Figure 5 shows the proposed framework’s four essential security functions: 
Monitoring / Data Collection, Analysing & Detecting, Alarm, and Respond. The 
attack patterns are detected by collecting and analysing data from all cloud layers. 
The data storage is structured in two separate knowledge databases that do not 
communicate. These are the Trust Assessment Database and the Risk Assessment 
Database. The reason for recommending two isolated databases is to reassure 
cloud providers for data pseudonymisation. The cloud providers processing of 
personal data is conducted in a way that the data can no longer be attributed to a 
specific data subject without the use of additional information [39]. The pseudon-
ymised information from those two databases is then combined in the Processing 
Knowledge Base. There, the risk of the attack is calculated and a response is sent 
whether it represents a suspicious threat or a false positive alarm. The calculation 
is conducted in the Decision Making server that determines the impact of each at-
tack pattern and the risk of the attack. The Respond function is connected to a 
Self-Learning Knowledge Base that classifies information about all attacks. It 
serves as an Advice as a Service for the Decision Making server. 
A Risk Software Agent (RSAg), a goal-oriented computer program that reacts 
to its environment and operates without continuous direct supervision to perform 
its function, is related to each function defining the impact and likelihood of each 
detected symptom. The Decision Making server determines the impact of each at-
tack pattern and the risk of the attack. Employing the aforementioned framework 
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could help minimise the rate of false positive alarms and increase the effectiveness 
of attack pattern detection systems.  
 
 
Figure 5: Proposed Framework for Attack Pattern Detection 
The analysis of attack patterns is conducted by calculating the score of all indi-
cators. Specifically, the proposed solution includes a definition for Risk (Ri) as a 
product of the Probability (Po) of a security compromise and its potential Impact 
(Im) (see 1). 
 
Ri = Po * Im (1) 
 
The recommended correlation is used to aggregate the attack scenarios and 
symptoms generated by all parts in the cloud computing environment. The Impact 
(Im) is a value consisting of the following indicators: Trust Assessment Indicator 
(TaI), Vulnerability (Vu) and Symptoms (Sy). Each of these indicators has a dif-
ferent impact. The Probability (Po) value is increased in relation to each indicator 
of an attack pattern (see 2). 
 
Im = TaI + Vu + Sy (2) 
 
The Impact (Im) and Probability (Po) of each indicator is defined by the cloud 
customer and cloud provider using data collected from all cloud layers. The aim is 
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to use attackers’ behavior to determine the Impact (Im) and expose a potential at-
tacker before an attack can take place. The value of Risk (Ri) related to each at-
tack determines whether the attack is successful or false positive alarm depending 
on the sensitivity of the targeted data as defined by the owner (cloud provider and 
cloud customer) (see 3). 
 
Ri = Po * (TaI + Vu + Sy) (3) 
1.9 Recommendations for further research and Conclusion 
In the current study a taxonomy and analysis of risk and trust assessment tech-
niques in the cloud computing paradigm are presented. Risk factors for a cloud-
specific risk assessment are classified. Furthermore, information sources and fac-
tors for trust assessment are categorised. The analysis of the techniques studied 
shows that most of the approaches should involve both cloud providers and cloud 
customers in the process of attack pattern detection. This could be achieved by 
sharing common processes of data collection and analysis.  
Therefore, a new framework for attack pattern detection in the cloud computing 
paradigm is proposed. A framework to recognise and analyse malicious actions 
based on risk and trust assessment factors and information sources related to at-
tack patterns. Specifically, the recommended framework classifies attacks by 
evaluating the probability of a security breach and its potential impact indicators, 
such as trust assessment Indicator, vulnerability, and symptoms. The outcome of 
this evaluation gives the likelihood of an attack pattern risk. Both cloud providers 
and cloud customers are involved in the data collection and correlation process. 
This classification might aid to protect data in the cloud and provide a method that 
could efficiently analyse suspicious attack actions and reduce false positive 
alarms.  
In the cloud computing environment, risk and trust assessment need to be as-
sessed continuously using multiple factors. These factors keep changing in the dy-
namic and constantly evolving cloud computing paradigm. In addition, multi-
cloud environments demand a more risk and trust assessment oriented analysis. 
Therefore, risk and trust assessment needs of cloud providers and cloud custom-
ers’ have to be addressed in more detail. Finally, future work should test the im-
plementation of the suggested framework in an actual cloud computing environ-
ment. 
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